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and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric 
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1. Introduction 
 
When firm hire workers, they have a lot of instruments to optimize the 
return on labor: bonuses, profit sharing, promotions etc. A remuneration 
schedule must be based on a set of verifiable results of the employee’s activity. 
Hence, the features of labor contracts depend on whether or not these results are 
observable and verifiable and can be included in those contracts. 
The theory of labor contracts started with the papers of Azariadis (1975), 
Baily (1974) and Gordon (1974), who presented models in which the workers 
performance is verifiable and explained the rigidity of real wages, but their 
models failed in explaining underemployment and unemployment.  
Moving away from the classical situation of symmetric information, the 
theory of optimal labor contracts in asymmetric information was devoted, 
generally speaking, to solve the problem of risk sharing and optimal incentives. 
Azariadis (1983) proved that when entrepreneurs are better informed about the 
state of nature than are their workers, this private information generally results 
in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker’s effort. Using different 
models, Green and Kahn (1983), Grossman and Hart (1983), Chari (1983) and 
Cooper (1983) assumed that workers cannot observe the values of some 
uncertain variables affecting the relationship; in such a situation the existence of 
asymmetric information generated some possible explanation for underemploy-
ment and involuntary unemployment. Hart (1983) showed that the Principal has 
an incentive to reveal the true state of nature if a long working time is linked to 
higher wages. 
Ito (1989) extended the model of Grossman and Hart (1983) of optimal 
labor contracts in asymmetric information about firm’s profitability and 
proposed a model allowing employment to vary over time. He described the 
impact of ex-post Pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract.  
When both participants – employee and employer – have different risk 
aversions, Rosen (1985) and Malcomson (1999) analyzed the optimal risk 
sharing and pointed out that the workers remuneration and the firm’s profit 
always vary in the same direction. Lazear (1986, 1999, 2000) analyzed the 
evolution of compensation schemes and the influence of financial incentives on 
the behavior and the performance of workers. Other authors (Fehr, Falk, 1999, 
Fehr, Schmidt, 2000) suggested that explicit incentives can also have 
counterproductive effects. 
Recent developments concerning the problem of optimal labor contracts 
dealt with the design of incentive schemes in risk and uncertainty situations 
such as: the link between the consumption level and the design of optimal labor 
contracts  (Postlewaite et al., 2008), the influence of incentive contracts on the Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent 
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total factor productivity (Bental, Demougin, 2006), incentives, promotions and 
tournaments (Kvaloy, Olsen, 2006, Gurtler, Krackel, 2010, Hart, Ma, 2010), 
incentives and multitasking (Schottner, 2008). 
Our approach is somewhat similar with that described by Green and Kahn 
(1983). They analyzed the optimal labor agreements and the dependence of 
workers wages on employment when this level is completely controlled by the 
firms. The purpose of the present paper is to extend this analysis for the case 
where the firm having private information can have one of three types of 
profitability levels. We also propose an alternative procedure to solve the 
optimization problem, using the informational rents as variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the basic 
assumptions used in the paper. In the next section the features of the optimal 
contracts in symmetric information are detailed. In Section 4 we define the 
optimization problem in the situation of asymmetric information and we 
propose a procedure to solve it. The Section 5 presents a full characterization of 
the optimal incentive contracts. The paper ends with the main conclusions and 
discusses some possible future developments. 
 
2. The basic assumptions 
 
Our approach is based on a standard Principal-Agent model, analyzed in 
both situations, symmetric and asymmetric information. We assume that one of 
the participants has private information about some characteristics affecting the 
results of the contractual agreement. This situation corresponds to an adverse 
selection problem. 
In Green and Kahn (1983), the principal is represented by a union or a set 
of workers providing labor force to a firm. For simplicity, we consider a labor 
contract between one firm and one worker, the basic framework being the same 
with that of the cited authors. 
The model is a monoperiod one, and the principal (the worker) has the 
preferences represented by the following utility function: 
   , Ulw uw vl   
where: 
l is the labor force provided by the worker; 
w is the wage paid by the employer (the firm); 
 vl is the worker’s disutility of providing l units of labor (working 
time). Daniela Elena Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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Note that the principal’s utility function is additive separable in wages 
and effort, and the functions    u   and    v   have the properties:  0, 0 uu     
(the principal is risk averse) and  0, 0 vv     respectively. 
The firm (the Agent) has the following objective function: 
   , lw f l w     
where: 
 f l  is the firm’s revenues obtained by the firm using l units of labor,  
with 0, 0 ff    ; 
  represents an efficiency parameter characterizing the firm’s technology 
(the profitability level) and is the firm’s private information. 
 
We also assume, with any loss of generality, that the Agent has an outside 
opportunity utility level  0 u   (zero reservation utility).  
The principal has all the bargaining power in determining the labor 
contract with the firm. 
The economic contractual variables of the problem to be solved are then: 
the labor force l  and the worker’s wage  w. 
 
3. The optimal contract in symmetric information 
 
In the situation of symmetric information, the Principal knows the firm’s 
technology, here characterized by the efficiency parameter  . The optimization 
problem to be solved is written as: 
  

, max
..
0
0, 0
lw uw vl
st
fl w
lw

  


 
The Lagrangean for the above problem is: 
       ,, Llw uw vl f l w          
The optimal solution (assuming an interior solution) satisfies the 
following first order conditions: 
0
L
l



 or     0 vl f l          ( 1 )  
0
L
w



 or   0 uw          ( 2 )  Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent 
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0
L




 or   0 fl w         ( 3 )  
We get from (2) that    0 uw      and hence the Agent’s participation 
constraint is binding at the optimum. 
Using the conditions (1) and (2), we get the features of the optimal 
contracts in the situation of symmetric information (the first best solution), 
denoted by 
** , lw: 
 at the optimum, the firm (Agent) gets no more than his reservation 
utility level: 

** 0 fl w    
So, the firm’s technology is perfectly known by the Principal, he can 
extract the Agent’s informational rent. 
 at optimum, the marginal profit of the firm is equal to the worker’s 
marginal rate of substitution, i.e.: 
 

*
*
*
vl
fl
uw


 

 
Therefore, the resulting contract satisfies the Pareto efficiency condition. 
 
4. The optimal contract in asymmetric information 
 
Suppose now that the efficiency parameter   describing the firm’s techno-
logy is the firm’s private information. Moreover, we consider that this parameter 
can take one of three possible values,    ,,
GMB    , with 
GMB     and 
the corresponding probabilities are    ,, ,
ii Pi G M B     . We also have 
0
GM MB         . 
In this case the Principal offers a menu of contracts 
      ,, ,, ,
GG MM BB lw lw lw , one for each type of Agent, hoping that each 
Agent will select the contract designed for him. The Principal’s optimization 
problem is now: 
 
          
,,, , ,
max
GG MM BB
GG G MM M BB B
lwlwlw
uw vl uw vl uw vl             
with the following constraints: 
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 participation constraints: 
 0
GG G fl w            ( 4 )  
 0
MM M fl w            ( 5 )  
 0
BB B fl w            ( 6 )  
 incentive compatibility constraints: 
 
GG GGM M f lw f lw        ( 7 )  
 
GG GGB B f lw f lw          ( 8 )  
 
M MM M BB f lw f lw          ( 9 )  
 
M MM M GG f lw f lw          ( 1 0 )  
  
BB BBM M f lw f lw          ( 1 1 )  
 
BB BBG G f lw f lw          ( 1 2 )  
 sign constraints: 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
GG MM BB lwlwlw    
Definition. A menu of contracts          ,, ,, ,
GG MM BB lw lw lw  is incentive 
feasible if it satisfies both sign constraints, participation constraints and 
incentive compatibility constraints (4)-(12). 
 
The model transformed using the informational rents as variables 
 
Let: 
  ,, ,
iii i Uf l w i G M B    
be the informational rent of the Agent having the profitability level 
i  . 
 
With this change of variables, the participation constraints (4)-(6) become 
simple sign constraints: 
0
G U            ( 1 3 )  
0
M U            ( 1 4 )  
0
B U            ( 1 5 )  
The incentive compatibility constraint given by (7) can be rewritten as: 
     
 
GG GGM MM MM M
MM MM
f l w fl fl fl w
fl fl w
  

   
  
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or  
GM M UU f l            ( 1 6 )  
Similarly, the other incentive constraints are transfomed: 

GM M UU f l            ( 1 6 )  

M BB UU f l            ( 1 7 )  
 2
GB B UU f l            ( 1 8 )  

M GG UU f l            ( 1 9 )  

BM M UU f l            ( 2 0 )  
 2
BG G UU f l            ( 2 1 )  
The objective function expressed in terms of informational rents and 
effort levels is given by: 
         
   
,, ,
,,
max ( ) ( )
()
GG M
MB B
GG G G G MM MM M
lUl
Ul U
BB B B B
F u fl U vl u fl U vl
uf lUv l
 

            
   
 
Due to the huge number of constraints, the new optimization problem, 
even simpler than the first one, is still complex. Before solving, we will try to 
reduce it. The next section presents a sequential procedure to determine which 
of the constraints are the relevant ones and relevant at the optimum.  
 
Reducing the problem 
Analyzing the participation constraints, only that one assigned to the least 
efficient technology is relevant. The following proposition states this result. 
 
Proposition 1. If the constraint  0
B U   is satisfied, then the constraints 
0
M U   and  0
G U   are also true. 
Proof 
The upward local incentive constraints (17) and (18) together with 
0
B U   yield to: 
   0
MB B B U U fl fl       
and, 
   220
GB B B U U fl fl       
Note that if  0
B l  , then the constraints hold strictly.  Daniela Elena Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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The above result has a straightforward economic interpretation: if the 
Agent with the type B accepts the contract and the worker supplies labor (the 
labor is strictly positive), then the profit for the other types of firm, M or G, is 
positive; these types of firm get more than their reservation utility level. 
Next, we state a well known result of the incentive theory, the 
implementability condition, which is used to compare the optimal values of the 
economic variable involved (the worker’s effort).  
  
Proposition 2. If the set of incentive feasible contracts is nonempty, then: 
GMB lll   (The Implementability condition  CI) 
Proof 
We use the upward local constraints and adding them we get: 
  from   
GM M UU f l     and   
M GG UU f l     it follows that: 
 
GM f lf l    
or 
GM ll  ; 
  in the same way, from  
M BB UU f l     and 

BM M UU f l     it follows that: 
  
M B f lf l     
or 
M B ll  . 
 
In what follows we ignore the downward global and incentive constraints. 
Later on we will prove that the solution derived for the reduced problem 
satisfies these constraints. Hence, the optimization problem to be solved has 
only one relevant participation constraint (that one corresponding to the type B) 
and the upward incentive constraints (16)-(18). But we are now interested in 
determine which of the remaining constraints are binding at the optimum. 
 
Proposition 3.  At the optimum, the participation constraint  0
B U   is 
binding. 
Proof 
Suppose this is not true and  0
B U  . Let  0    be a small positive value 
such that  0
B U  . We define the menu of contracts 
      ,, ,, ,
GG MM BB lU lU lU       and this menu is incentive feasible. 
Using that the function   u   is strictly increasing we get: Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent 
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     
      

,, ,, , ( )
() ()
,, ,, ,
GG MM BB G G G G G
MM M M M BB B B B
GG MM BB
Fl U l U l U u fl U vl
u fl U vl u fl U vl
Fl U l U l U
    
   
          
            

 
And this contradicts the optimality of the solution 
      ,, ,, ,
GG MM BB lU lU lU . 
Therefore, at the optimum, the profit obtained by the firm B is equal to its 
reservation value. 
In conclusion, we have:  
0
B U            ( 2 2 )  
In addition, we have already shown that the remaining participation 
constraints (for types M and G) are also satisfied. 
 
Proposition 4. The upward global constraint (18) is implied by the local 
incentive constraints (16) and (17). 
Proof 
Combining the constraints (16) and (17) and using the monotonicity of 
the function    f   and the implementability condition we get: 
    
  () ( ) 2
GM M B B M
BB M B B
UU f l U f l f l
Uf l f l Uf l
 

     
    
 
Hence, we can ignore the upward global incentive constraint when 
solving the problem. 
Next, we show that the two remaining incentive constraints of the 
optimization problem are binding at the optimum. 
 
Proposition 5. The upward local incentive constraint (17) is binding at the 
optimum. 
Proof 
Indeed, suppose that strict inequality holds, i.e.:  
M B Uf l   . 
The solution  ,, ,, , 0
GG MM B lU lU l    is feasible for a small positive 
value   0   . The constraint (16) can be written as: 
 
GM M UU f l       
On the other hand, we now have: 
       2
GM M B M B U U fl fl fl fl            . Daniela Elena Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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Then, the constraint (18) is also satisfied (for a small value  0   ). But 
we have already stated this result in the Proposition 4. 
Since the objective function has a higher value for the new allocation: 
   
      

,, ,, , 0 ( )
() ()
,, ,, , 0
GG MM B G G G G G
MM M M M BB B B
GG MM B
Fl U l U l u fl U vl
uf lU v l uf l v l
Fl U l U l
   
  
         
          

 
this contradicts the optimality of the solution. 
 
Therefore, at the optimum, the following holds: 

M B Uf l            ( 2 3 )  
 
Proposition 6. The upward local constraint (16) is binding at the optimum. 
Proof 
We can prove the proposition in the same way we did above. 
Suppose that      
GB M Uf l f l    . 
Then, the feasible solution      ,, , , , 0
GG M BB lU l fl l    is strictly 
better than the optimal solution      ,, , , , 0
GG M BB lUl fl l   , and this is a 
contradiction. 
Therefore, at the optimum, we have: 
    
GB M Uf l f l           ( 2 4 )  
 
5. Characterizing the optimal contracts in asymmetric information 
  
Taking into account all the results from the previous propositions and 
ignoring for a while the downward local and global constraints, the 
optimization problem is significantly reduced. Next, we use the expressions for 
the informational rents given in  (22)-(24). The principal’s problem becomes: 
 Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent 
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       
   

   
,, ,
,
max ( ) ( )
()
..
GG M
MB
GG G G G MM MM M
lUl
Ul
BB B B
MB
GB M
Fu f l U v lu f l U v l
uf l v l
st
Uf l
Uf l f l
 



           
  

 
 
The constraints are binding at the optimum and hence we can replace the 
variables 
M U  and 
G U  into the objective function. We finally get an 
unconstrained optimization problem: 
 
        
         
,,
max ( )
()
GMB
RG G G B M G
ll l
MM M B M BB B B
F u fl fl fl v l
uf l f l v l uf l v l
 
   
      

          
 
The first order conditions are the following: 

0
R
G
F
l



 or       0
GG G G uf l v l           (25) 

0
R
M
F
l



 or  
       0
GM M M M M uf l u f l v l                   (26) 

0
R
B
F
l



 or 
        0
GB MB B B B B uf l uf l u f lv l                      
          ( 2 7 )  
  
Later on, we will use these conditions in order to characterize the optimal 
menu of contracts. We must now show that the ignored constraints are also 
satisfied at the optimum. 
Since the informational rents are given by the relations (22)-(24), the 
downward local constraint (19),   
M GG UU f l    , becomes: 
      
BB M G f lf l f lf l       
or   
GM f lf l    Daniela Elena Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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and this is true, using the implementability condition and the monotonicity of 
the function     f  . 
In a similar manner, the downward local constraint (20), 

BM M UU f l    , can be written as: 
   0
BM f lf l     
or   
M B f lf l    , which is also true. 
The downward global constraint (21),    2
BG G UU f l    , becomes: 
      02
BM G f lf l f l       
or      2
GBM f lf lf l , which is also true from the same implementability 
condition and the increasing function    f  . 
We can now fully characterize the second best solution. The main features 
are summarize in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem. In the situation of asymmetric information, the optimal menu of 
contracts         ,,,, ,
GG MM BB lw lw lw  entails: 
A. The optimal level of labor assigned to the firm G, 
G l , and the 
corresponding optimal wage 
G w  satisfy the efficiency condition: 
 

G
GG
G
vl
fl
uw


 

 
This type of firm gets a positive informational rent, which is dependent 
on the optimal labor offered to the firms with types B and M: 
 
GB M Uf l f l        
B.  The  optimal level of labor assigned to the firm M, 
M l , and the 
corresponding optimal wage 
M w  satisfy the first order condition: 
 

 
 
M G G
MM M
M MM
vl uw
f lf l
uw uw



 
  

 
This type of firm gets a positive informational rent, which is dependent 
on the optimal labor offered to the firm: 

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C. The optimal level of labor assigned to the firm B, 
B l , and the 
corresponding optimal wage 
B w  satisfy the first order condition: 
 

   
 
B GM GM
BB B
B BB
vl uw uw
f lf l
uw uw



      

 
This type of firm gets no informational rent,  0
B U  . 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we extended the problem of designing the optimal labor 
agreements first introduced by Green and Kahn (1983). We adapted their model 
to the case where the adverse selection parameter characterizing the firm’s 
private information is represented by its profitability level. The central goal of 
the paper was to derive the features of the optimal labor contracts in the 
situation of asymmetric information when the parameter takes three possible 
values. If the firm has high profitability level, the optimal contract is Pareto 
efficient, while the firm gets a positive informational rent due to the 
informational advantage it has. The principal must give up this rent in order to 
determine the agent to reveal his private information. On the other hand, the 
optimal contracts designed for the firm with medium or low profitability level 
are not longer Pareto efficient. The inefficiency is directly dependent on the 
spread of uncertainty regarding the efficiency parameter and of course on the 
functional form of the objective functions.  
We showed that the presence of asymmetric information affects the form 
of the optimal labor contracts, but our analysis is not complete. We here 
assumed that the union has full bargaining power, but it is also plausible that 
the firm has the bargaining power. We could be interested if the short term 
contract can be extended or adapted for a longer period of time and if a long 
term contract is Pareto efficient. Of course, further work should be done 
concerning these problems. 
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